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Brought to the 
Chinese Economy  





The impact of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th US 
president in the context of stock market reactions and economic policy 
uncertainty (EPU) within three key zones in ‘the Greater China Region’ 
(Hong Kong, Taiwan and China Mainland) are examined in this article. 
The chosen research period is from January 2014 to June 2017, and 
the EPU Index in the USA and the UK is used as a proxy to measure 
political uncertainty in two of the world major economies and how 
they impact on the Chinese stock market. The main contribution of the 
article can be found in the analysis of how stock market performance 
can be driven by policy-related uncertainty shocks in the international 
context. The results show that the stock markets in the ‘Greater China 
Region’ did not seem to react either to the uncertainty generated by 
Brexit or to the election of Donald Trump, implying that the Chinese 
stock markets appear to be quite resilient to the recent political events 
that have been disrupting the global economy.
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1. Introduction
From the 1970s, researchers have identified political risk as a significant 
factor that can severely disturb the performance of developing and emerg-
ing countries (Benacek, Lenihan, Andreosso-O’Callaghan, Michalikova, 
& Kan, 2014; Suleman, 2012). Earlier explanations in the field suggest 
that political events can cause a significant loss of wealth that can also 
trigger increases in stock market volatility (Brewer, 1981; Clark, 1997; 
Clark & Tunaru, 2003; Root, 1972; Simon, 1982). The magnitude and 
relevance of materialised losses are also linked to unfolding political 
events that can subsequently spill over to the rest of the economy by the 
generation of economic and financial uncertainty (Clark & Tunaru, 2005). 
Recent political events, in a macroeconomic context, such as the UK’s 
decision to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016 and the election 
of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the USA signify important 
changes to the world economies. As we are moving into a new area of 
remarkable ambiguity, global economic stability and growth are being 
challenged once more. Trump’s initial approach to international relations 
with China has been creating significant levels of confusion and concern 
among leaders in Beijing. During his campaign, the candidate made serious 
accusations against China, with messages stating that China was a currency 
manipulator and that it was stealing millions of jobs from the US economy. 
Furthermore, he beckoned the need of getting a new deal from China that 
in view of his inexperience in foreign affairs has just been contributing to 
making the situation more chaotic and that seems to be leading towards 
a commercial antagonism between the two countries. Concern has been 
raised around Trump’s intent of renegotiating some of the existing trade 
treaties and of introducing tariffs on Chinese goods of up to 45 per cent, 
threats that have now become a reality with the introduction of tariffs on 
Chinese steel and aluminium imports. Analysts are indicating that the 
Trump’s administration might harden tax imports, and that the alleged cur-
rency manipulation in China would justify the introduction of protectionist 
measures. However, as the situation unfolds, Chinese authorities and the 
international community are quite unsure of what to expect from the US 
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new President’s initial comments, and countries are starting to retaliate. 
At the same time, the UK new Prime Minister, Theresa May, is trying to 
redefine the UK’s relations with countries, such as China, with the aim 
of ensuring that an optimal balance between the economic and political 
dimension be kept. The development of a coherent strategy emanating from 
London that looks to build on a sustainable strategy towards China seems 
to be another source of ambiguity and uncertainty. In general, analysts’ 
views are quite mixed, with some suggesting that China could be a clear 
winner, and others a loser from the Trump and Brexit situation. Hence, 
the main motivation of this research article is twofold:
• to identify the main challenges and opportunities that the new US 
President and Brexit events are bringing to the Chinese economy 
in terms of its international position.
• to examine China’s strategic moves to deal with the uncertainty 
created by Trump’s election and Brexit on its economic growth 
and development and its strategic position in the Pacific region.
To illustrate the points outlined earlier, this article examines whether the 
financial markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China reacted in a 
similar or different fashion to Brexit and to Trump’s election. The analysis 
is supported by the use of the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index 
for the USA and the UK, with the aim of measuring market instability 
over the period and implications for the selected stock markets. To the 
best of the authors’ knowledge, this study would be the first attempt to 
analyse how Brexit and the recent US Presidential election impacted on 
the stock markets of the Greater China Region, which refers to Mainland 
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.1
2. Brexit and the New US Administration: 
Implications for ‘The Greater China Region’
The world is facing challenging times, as the balance of regional power 
is shifting with emerging economies taking more prominent roles, while 
developed economies seem to be deploying anti-globalisation and pro-
tectionist policies (Tanaka, 2017). For several advanced economies, the 
scenario is one where a surge of populism accompanies a sentiment of 
anti-free trade, a phenomenon that has clearly been illustrated by both the 
UK Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as the President of 
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the USA in 2016. When looking at emerging economies, the case of China 
can be considered as outstanding. China has undergone rapid economic 
growth over the past three decades, and in 2011, China’s GDP overtook 
that of Japan, and the country became the second largest economy in the 
world. However, years of double-digit growth have given way to a new 
model that is considered as the new normal and which has refocused to 
target annual growth rates at around 6.5 per cent. This level of growth 
could be affected if the Trump’s administration takes a more hostile 
approach towards China, and this could unfold into a trade antagonism 
that would damage the interests of the country as well as those of the 
East Asian region as a whole. As China is benefiting from globalisation, 
and its global and regional power keeps increasing, the study of how the 
Greater China Region might be impacted upon by an increase of market 
uncertainty triggered by recent political events originating in two of the 
world most developed economies is of key interest. An analysis of policy 
uncertainty combined with stock markets performance will offer an initial 
view on how the Greater China Region reacted to the uncertainty created 
by the new political wave.
China is considered as an export-intensive economy by global stand-
ards, whose economic projections are heavily linked to the strength and 
health of world trade. As a result, recent geopolitical events are a source 
of major concern to Chinese policymakers. President Trump’s policies 
and views towards China need to be closely monitored, as the USA is 
one of China’s key trading partners, a situation that came to light with the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis. If Trump’s plans to introduce tariff barriers 
targeting China (of 45% on Chinese imports) materialise, Chinese total 
exports will be significantly affected in the short term, given that around 
20 per cent of the country’s total exports are bound to the US economy. 
The situation is further convoluted by the uncertainty that surrounds the 
Trump’s administration economic policy programme. Moreover, the case 
of Brexit is also a major area of concern, but in this case, China might 
be able to weather a negative impact on its economy in the short term, 
as China exports to the UK account only for 2.5 per cent. However, in 
the medium to long term, the implications would be more important, as 
the departure of the UK from the EU could signify a change in direction 
regarding trade policies from the EU towards emerging markets regions. 
Bearing in mind that the UK has traditionally been representing one of 
the most liberal-minded trading economies in the EU, its departure from 
the EU could make the materialisation of a deeper China–EU economic 
deal (a long-term objective) quite difficult. Additionally, a chaotic Brexit 
where trade and investment are significantly disrupted will cause a 
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knock-on effect in the Eurozone with clear ramifications in China. The 
industrial sectors that will clearly be affected are chemicals, machinery 
and consumer-based sectors since China exports around 15–20 per cent 
of its global total to Europe. Therefore, the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU can damage China’s global position in the long term, as the country 
could be left in a remarkable vulnerable position. China’s strong com-
mitment to export activities makes the country quite susceptible to the 
potential upsurge in protectionist measures that are being sought by major 
advanced economies.
Examining the impact of Brexit and Donald Trump’s election on the 
performance of the main stock markets in the Greater China Region will 
offer an initial view on how the country is reacting to global uncertainty. 
The stock markets of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong are con-
sidered to be quite different regarding their levels of political freedom, the 
fairness of their political system and the level of centralisation in terms 
of their political and economic approach and also in terms of the level of 
market intervention. Mainland China is characterised by a more rigid and 
centralised model with heavy political control on its economic model. The 
region also exhibits the highest levels of economic growth. In contrast, 
Taiwan enjoys the highest level of political freedom of all four sub-markets 
while its economic and legal system seem to be fairer. Hong Kong is well 
known for its relatively non-interventionist economic policies, encompass-
ing the freedom of capital movements and a well-developed regulatory and 
legal environment. These conditions have contributed to the development 
and consolidation of Hong Kong as a regional and international financial 
centre. Hong Kong Stock Exchange plays a major role in raising capital 
for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Economic growth in Hong 
Kong is based on a free market economy with strong ties to international 
trade and finance, characteristics that left its economy significantly exposed 
to the 2008 Global Economic and Financial Crisis. However, due to its 
increasing level of integration with Mainland China, Hong Kong managed 
to execute a swift recovery from the global meltdown. However, its heavy 
reliance on foreign trade and investment is enhancing its vulnerability in 
the global context. Taiwan’s economic model relies on an export-oriented 
approach like the one followed by Hong Kong. The main trading partner 
of Taiwan is Mainland China, which makes its economic and financial 
model quite exposed to external shocks and more specifically to disrup-
tions originating from China. This entails that Taiwan is more sensitive 
to regional issues rather than to global and international events. This 
is illustrated by the economic slowdown faced by Taiwan that can be 
somehow explained by the economic deceleration experienced by China 
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over the past few years with its transition from a double-digit growing 
economy to a new normal growth model. In the international context, 
Taiwan’s economic relations with the USA keep improving, as the USA 
is Taiwan’s second largest trading partner and its main source of foreign 
direct investment (Rosier, O’Connor, & Cuevas, 2016).
3. Political Events, Policy Uncertainty and  
Stock Market Reactions
Political events and, in particular, the impact and implications that politi-
cal risk might have on the performance of stock markets are the areas 
of research that do not seem to attract the same amount of attention as 
the risks associated with asset pricing, market (systemic) risk, interest 
rate risk, exchange rate risk or credit risk (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper, 
2002). Furthermore, the case of emerging markets—and especially of 
those markets that are characterised by a rigid and less liberal approach 
in their economic and/or political regimes—is commonly associated with 
greater levels of uncertainty (Benacek et al., 2014; Bin, 2015). Political 
stability is an area of concern for a country’s economic and financial per-
formance because a political environment that is predictable and reliable 
offers a favourable environment for investors who perceive the economy 
to be less risky (Manzoor, 2013). Unstable political situations have been 
associated with a significant reduction in foreign direct investment as 
the market is not considered safe, and economic and financial activities 
might not be properly controlled and monitored, with potential failures 
in terms of law compliance and transparency of operations (Chan & Wei, 
1996). Furthermore, developing economies that face disruptions due to an 
unstable political climate appear to be more affected by macroeconomic 
imbalances that lead to greater levels of risk rather than to disruptions with 
origins in international events (Aggarwal, Inclan, & Leal, 1999; Khalid 
& Rajaguru, 2010).
Research exploring the implications of political risk on market perfor-
mance seems to be focused on the analysis of political news and the way 
financial markets react to them. In particular, stock markets seem to be 
more responsive to new information regarding political decisions rather 
than to information that looks into implications and spillover effects of 
domestic and foreign policy. According to Tan and Gannon (2002), the 
reaction of the stock market depends on the political news, with prices 
expected to increase if the news lead to an upward revision of investor’s 
expectations and prices following a downward trend if the opposite occurs. 
Researchers have followed different approaches when looking at political 
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events and analysing market reactions. For instance, Soultanaeva (2008) 
used political news as a proxy to analyse political risk and found a weak 
relationship between political risk and the volatility of the stock market. 
Fong and Koh (2002) looked at the Hong Kong stock market and how 
political risk has induced a regime shift in stock market volatility with a 
strong evidence found in terms of regime shift in conditional volatility 
as well as significant volatility asymmetry during highly volatile periods.
Mahmood, Irfan, Iqbal, Kamran, and Ijaz (2014) examined 50 major 
political events in Pakistan and their impact on the KSE-100 index returns 
with the aim of illustrating how political events contribute to increased 
levels of economic risk in the context of a less developed economy that 
might be more reactive to unstable political conditions when compared 
to developed economies (Bittlingmayer, 1998). Research findings show 
that the Pakistani stock market reacts to political events and that, as a 
result, investors are quite hesitant to participate in this market. The case 
of Pakistan is an interesting one as its political environment has been 
quite unpredictable over the past 50 years; this has been characterised by 
the inability of any elected government to complete their 5-year mandate. 
Colombia is another example of a less developed economy that has been 
examined and that shows how market returns are negatively influenced by 
criminal activities and an uncertain political environment (Laverde, Varua, 
& Garces-Ozanne, 2009). Researchers have found that political stability 
conditions might contribute to accelerate long-term growth projections. 
On the other hand, research outcomes focusing on developed economies 
seem to offer a different view regarding the magnitude and implications 
that political uncertainty might bring to stock markets performance. For 
example, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2006) looked at the performance of 
the German stock exchange and they found a poor relationship between 
political changes and stock market performance.
The conducted literature review shows that most of the research in 
the field seems to be looking at the impact on internal/domestic politi-
cal events with little attention given to external and global shocks in the 
context of developing and emerging economies. As a result, a research 
gap has been identified in the area, and considering recent developments 
in the international political arena, this study is bringing a clear contri- 
bution to this area.
3.1 Economic Policy Uncertainty
EPU refers to a non-zero probability of changes in the existing eco-
nomic policies that determine the rule of the game for economic agents 
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(Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2012, 2016). EPU can impact upon economic and 
financial agents in different manners: (a) firms may change or delay invest-
ment decisions depending on the levels of employment, consumption and 
savings; (b) production costs might be affected, and investment patterns 
can change depending on the economic cycle; and (c) risks in financial 
markets can be impacted as inflation rates, interest rates and expected risk 
premiums will vary depending on EPU. Recent economic and political 
events have increased researchers’ interests in understanding the economic 
impact of policy uncertainty (Bloom, 2009). In particular, the implica-
tions of EPU for financial risk management and the implications for stock 
market performance is an area of study that is not much developed with 
most of the existing research focusing on the analysis of market perfor-
mance over the last two or three decades (Anatonakakis, Chatziantoniou, 
& Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Kang & Ratti, 2015; Li & Peng, 
2017; Liu & Zhang, 2015). The extant literature shows significant evidence 
that EPU does confound market participants and policymakers, in terms 
of financial risk. Li and Peng (2017) showed that the absolute changes 
in the US EPU index have a negative impact on the co-movement of the 
domestic market. Another recent study looking at policy uncertainty and 
implications for the US stock market volatility by Arouri, Estay, Rault, 
and Roubaud (2016) shows that an increase in policy uncertainty reduces 
in a significant manner stock returns and that the effects become stronger 
and persistent during times of extreme market volatility. However, to the 
best of the authors’ knowledge, the implications of Brexit and of the new 
US administration combined with the analysis of EPU and implications 
for the Greater China Region is an area of research that has not being 
addressed as yet. Moreover, the recent literature in the area (Hammoudeh 
& McAleer, 2015) highlights how the topic of financial risk management 
and its connections to policy uncertainty is a topic widely researched, 
cited and downloaded, justifying thereby the need for further empirical 
contributions in the area.
4. Data Description and Methodological 
Framework
The data chosen to support this study is based on daily time series of stock 
market indices downloaded from DataStream. The Standard and Poor’s 
500 index and the FTSE 100 index are selected as proxies for stock market 
behaviour that take into account political instability in the USA and the 
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UK. The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE composite Index), the Hong Kong’s 
Hang-Seng index and the Shanghai Security Exchange SSE composite 
indices are selected to measure stock market performance in the Greater 
China Region. The selected sample covers the period from January 2014 
to June 2017. To control for political instability, the policy uncertainty 
index is also included as part of the study. The US EPU index and the 
UK EPU index are obtained from the EPU website. The EPU indices are 
computed on the basis of daily news from newspaper archives that contain 
thousands of newspapers and other news sources from across the globe. 
Studies using Baker’s et al. (2012) EPU measures found that the indices 
are a good proxy for real-world economy policy uncertainty (Wang, 
Chen, & Huang, 2014). Consequently, this study also considers EPU as 
a variable that will help us adjust our models with the aim of creating a 
stronger filter for the political events under consideration.
4.1 Brexit Highlights
Back in June 2016, the UK voters chose to leave the EU, and soon after-
wards, they welcomed their new Prime Minister Theresa May. The Prime 
Minister confirmed the exit of the UK from the EU by triggering Article 
50 of the Lisbon Treaty on 29 March 2017. For the purpose of this study, 
the Brexit event timeline needs to be considered, as it will determine how 
the dummy variables that look after Brexit are constructed.
Figures 1 and 2 offer a general overview on the behaviour of the 
EPU indices close to the outcome of the UK referendum and the US 
Table 1. Year 2016
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Figure 1. Economic Policy Uncertainty Indexes
Source: The authors.
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election. The indices show a relative stability before the events outcome 
is released with interesting developments in both countries that seem 
to reflect a level of persistence regarding uncertainty that lasted at least 
over a week before the indices revert to more stable levels. The EPU 
indices are used in this study to delimit the range of the dummy vari-
ables to measure for Brexit and Trump’s election uncertainty. Values of 
1 are given to the date when the UK referendum results were released 
(24 June 2016) and the announcement of Trump’s election as the 45th 
US president (8 November 2016). The dummy variables help to delimit 
two scenarios, one looking at a week of market uncertainty and another 
looking at a prolonged period that considers the aftermath of each one 
of the events until June 2017.
Figure 2. UK and US EPUs Evolution Around Events Date
Source: The authors.
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4.2 US Elections Highlights
The Chinese stock market reaction to Brexit and Trump’s election 
is measured by the identification of abnormal mean returns and also by 
looking at the potential shift in returns volatility. The research framework 
is supported by three different models that are discussed in the following 
sections.
4.2.1 Model One
The first part of the study examines the potential existence of abnormal 
mean returns by implementing a multivariate regression model (MVRM) 
that aligns to the approach proposed by Bin, Blenman, and Chen (2004), 
Kim, Nam, and Wynne (2009) and Nazir, Younus, Kaleem, and Anwar 
(2014). The main purpose of this model is to identify a system of port-
folio return equations for event announcements with systematic risk and 
political events being factored into the pricing process. Equation (1) is 
the generic equation that would be adjusted according to the event under 
study (Trump election or Brexit referendum) and that would be captured 
by the inclusion of a dummy variable in the model.
 R R Dummy, , , ,i t i i m t i t i ta b d f= + + +  (1)
































on Mexico to 

















Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 157
where
Ri,t = return on a Greater China Region (GCR) market index i on day t.
ai = intercept coefficient for GCR index.
bi = coefficient of sensitivity to the Trump’s election or to Brexit.
Rm,t =  S&P500 return or FTSE 100 return, depending on the event 
under consideration.
Dummy = dummy variable that equals 1 during the window period 
that considers the event under study (Trump or Brexit) and 0 
otherwise.
d = price return reaction to the political event on the corresponding 
GCR index i.
fi,t = an independent and identically distributed normal error.
The study is supported by the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
methodology on daily returns over the 253 and 156 trading days around 
the identified leadership event windows (Brexit referendum result and 
US presidential election respectively). Additionally, the estimation is 
supported by daily returns over a week after the event under study in order 
to consider short-run implications. In this way, the jointly estimate of 
the abnormal mean return performance of the three GCR indices is consid-
ered over a short-time period that is very close to the political event under 
study and also over a longer period of sustained market and EPU. As such, 
the research hypotheses under consideration are as follows:
Hypothesis A: d = 0—Meaning that the estimated abnormal return 
for each one of the three GCR market indices equals zero when 
the corresponding event—leadership event (Trump’s election or 
Brexit) occurs.
The model is adjusted to consider the implications of EPU, and as a 
result, the initial regression equation presented in Equation (1) is adjusted 
as follows:
 R R Dummy EPU, , , , ,i t i i m t i t i t i ta b d i f= + + + +  (2)
Hypothesis B: i = 0—Meaning that international economic political 
uncertainty does not generate an impact on the three GCR market 
indices.
The model is estimated to test again for: d = 0, with the aim of verifying 
if there is a significant change on the outcomes once the EPU index is 
introduced in the model estimation.
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Liu and Zhang (2015) showed that incorporating EPU as an additional 
variable in the implementation of volatility prediction models significantly 
improves their forecasting ability. Therefore, our decision of including 
EPU as part of our research framework is more than justified as we aim 
to cross-check our results and to analyse if the introduction of EPU in the 
model brings different and significant results confirming the importance 
of EPU for stock market performance.
4.2.2 Model Two
Model one was adjusted to introduce four control variables that seek to 
find out if there are variations regarding the outcomes of EPU as outlined 
in Equation (2). The initial regression model presented in Equation (1) 
above is adjusted once more to integrate the selected control variables. 
A note of caution is needed here, as there were limitations regarding the 
control variables associated with market uncertainty that could not be 
considered as part of this study due to their unavailability as daily fre-
quency variables. For example, relevant economic indicators for China 
were not considered as there were no data available in DataStream with 
a daily frequency. A similar situation was faced when trying to integrate 
additional indicators for EPU like Global economic uncertainty or Chinese 
economic uncertainty, as available data were found in monthly frequency. 
After careful consideration of the variables that could improve the model, 
four additional indexes were considered. The selected control variables 
were as follows: (a) the volatility index (VIX) that was included as a vari-
able that helped to capture market sentiment over the period of study, as 
it is considered as a good estimator of expected market volatility; (b) the 
Hong Kong volatility index (HSI Volatility Index) is an indicator of the 
volatility exhibited by the Hong Kong Stock market, and it is considered 
as the premier barometer for investor sentiment; (c) the Chinese 3-month 
repo rate (China—3mRepo rate) is the interbank rate on short-term loans 
between banks in local currency and that seeks to measure for market 
instability derived from access to liquidity and the fourth control vari-
able was the Chinese Renminbi 3month FX volatility variable to capture 
instability in the currency market. Equation (3) considers the additional 
model to be estimated.
 R R Dummy EPU Control, , , , , ,i t i i m t i t i t i t i ta b d i c f= + + + + +  (3)
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4.2.3 Model Three
The third phase of the estimation process considers market volatility 
employing the ‘Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity’ 
GARCH framework, with the objective of examining the effects that the 
chosen events will have on volatility performance in the corresponding 
GCR stock index returns. The Exponential GARCH model introduced by 
Nelson (1991) allows to analyse the impact of ‘good and bad news’ on 
volatility. The EGARCH (1, 1) is chosen on the grounds that this model 
does not have constraints regarding ‘non-negativity’ of its parameters 
(Bin, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2005; Suleman, 2012). The EGARCH model 
is defined as follows:
 ( ) ( ) ( )log logf zt t t t2 1 12v ~ a b v= + +- -  (4)
 ( ) (| |) | |f z z E z zt t t t t1 1 1 1c= - +- - - -  (5)
where
  /z t tt 1 1 1e v=- - -  (6)
a, b and c are parameters for the conditional variance estimation. The 
alpha coefficient explains the influence of past standardised residuals on 
current volatility. The beta coefficient measures the impact of past-period 
variance on the current period conditional variance. The gamma coefficient 
accounts for the asymmetry effect. If gamma is negative, it will signify 
that bad news have a greater impact on volatility than good news with 
the same magnitude. The EGARCH models the logarithmic time-varying 
conditional variance; consequently, these models allowed its parameters 
to become negative. As a result, the model is not subject to non-negativity 
constraints in the parameters as it is the case for the traditional GARCH 
and GJR models. However, in order to meet stationary requirements, the 
beta coefficient should be less than one (b < 1). Since the gamma coef-
ficient looks at asymmetric effects, the coefficient would be equal to zero 
if positive and negative shocks have an equal impact on the variance. 
If the magnitude of a negative (positive) shock causes the variance to 
increase (decrease), the gamma coefficient will be lower than zero (c < 0). 
In the case that positive (negative) shocks cause the variance to increase 
(decrease), the gamma coefficient would be greater than zero (c > 0). 
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The variance equation considered in this study is outlined as follows:
 ( ) ( ) ( )log logf z Dummyt j t t j t t2 1 12v ~ a b v {= + + +- -  (7)
 ( ) ( ) ( )log logf z Dummy EPUt j t t j t t t2 1 12v ~ a b v { t= + + + +- -  (8)
Table 3. EGARCH Stationarity Restriction
Coefficients Meaning Implications
a Represents the magnitude 
effect or the symmetric 
effect of the model, the 
GARCH effect.
The coefficient measures the 
effect of the previous period in 
the information set and explains 
the past standardised residuals’ 
influence on the current volatility.
b Measures the persistence 
in conditional volatility 
irrespective of anything 
happening in the market –  
b < 1
If beta is relatively large, volatility 
takes a long time to die out 
c Measures the asymmetry 
of the leverage effect.
If c = 0, the model is symmetric.
If c < 0, positive shocks generate 
less volatility than negative shocks.
If c > 0, positive shocks are more 
destabilising than negative news.
Source: The authors.




China Taiwan FTSE 100 S&P 500
Mean 0.0116 0.0436 0.0174 0.0113 0.0307
Standard 
deviation
1.0597 1.6138 0.7891 0.9103 0.7900
Skewness −0.3468 −1.3002 −0.5128 −0.1682 −0.3834
Kurtosis 5.979707 9.8401 6.7502 5.6071 5.8693
Jarque Bera 350.9905 2008.131 566.8596 259.1380 330.8018
Observations 900 900 900 900 900
Source: The authors.
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5. Empirical Findings
Descriptive statistics show that market returns over the period of study are 
positive for all cases with Mainland China exhibiting better performance 
followed by the S&P500, while stock markets in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
seem to follow the overall performance of the FTSE100. The standard 
deviation signposts the Shanghai stock market as the most volatile over 
the period of study with the S&P500 exhibiting lower fluctuations. All the 
markets are negatively skewed and exhibit kurtosis and non-normality.
The estimation of Equations (1) and (2) shows that the markets do 
not exhibit abnormal returns in any case. The models considered market 
uncertainty since the date of occurrence of each one of the events (Brexit 
and Trump’s election) over a week and also over a longer period (up 
to June 2017). Furthermore, the inclusion of the EPU index and of the 
control variables did not affect the initial outcomes. The results indicate 
that Brexit and Trump’s election did not lead to a significant increase 
in market uncertainty in the GCR. The research findings suggest that 
Chinese stock markets might be waiting for specific actions to be taken 
by the UK and US administration that show if they aim to harm China’s 
interests. The results do not seem to align with research in the field that 
has suggested that the EPU index helps to identify if market participants 
are reacting to political events (Anatonakakis et al., 2013; Brogaard & 
Detzel, 2015; Kang & Ratti, 2015; Li & Peng, 2017; Liu & Zhang, 2015). 
The outcomes for the GCR seem to align with the study of Dopke and 
Pierdzioch (2006) which looks at the German stock market, where politi-
cal changes showed a poor relationship with stock market performance. 
These outcomes indicate that Chinese stock markets might be maturing 
and that they start to exhibit patterns commonly associated with more 
developed and established stock markets. On the other hand, there is a need 
for highlighting the fact that Chinese stock markets are heavily prone to 
state intervention and that SOEs have a heavy representation among the 
listed companies.
The estimation of the EGARCH model confirms the non-existence 
of abnormal returns as the d coefficient is insignificant in every case. 
The results show that Hong Kong and Taiwan are more affected by the 
occurrence of negative news as the c coefficient is negative and significant 
in every case. However, Mainland China differs, and the Shanghai stock 
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Notes: ~ (constant); aj (Impact of magnitude of a shock(size) and bjGarch effect. 
Persistence of past volatility (past volatility explains current volatility); c  (impact of sign 
of shock); if the coefficient is negative, there is a leverage effect: bad news have more of 
an impact than good news on the same size; { (dummy variable). Volatility estimations 
were not adjusted to include the control variables as the coefficients were not found to be 
statistically significant. *1% significance level, **5% significance level, *** 10% significance 
level.
The EGARCH model outcomes do not seem to be affected by the 
inclusion of the EPU index in the estimation, and the research outcomes 
confirm that Hong Kong and Taiwan seem to react to negative news, 
whereas China is more sensitive to the occurrence of positive news. The 
markets do not seem to show a significant reaction to Brexit and Trump’s 
election as the d coefficient measuring for each event is statistically 
insignificant; this is also the case for i that captures the impact of the 
EPU index. The core research findings indicate that Brexit and Trump’s 
election do not seem to be generating significant levels of volatility in the 
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GCR. The results are not surprising as over the years China has managed 
to remain quite isolated to global shocks with the government exercising 
high levels of intervention in its capital markets. While being gradually 
reformed, the Chinese financial markets are still rather insulated from 
major international shocks. These results seem to confirm the strong posi-
tion of China in the international context and that might help the country 











































































































































Notes: ~ (constant); aj (Impact of magnitude of a shock(size) and bj Garch effect. 
Persistence of past volatility (past volatility explains current volatility); c  (impact of sign 
of shock); if the coefficient is negative, there is a leverage effect: bad news has more of an 
impact than good news on the same size; { (dummy variable);  t (EPU variable). Volatility 
estimations were not adjusted to include the control variables as coefficients were not 
found to be statistically significant. *1% significance level, **5% significance level, *** 10% 
significance level.
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to weather economic policies from developed economies that aim to harm 
its global position.
6. Critical Insights on China’s Stock Holding 
Patterns
During the 1980s, the Chinese stock market started its development process 
with the introduction of a legal framework that sought to allow compa-
nies to issue shares and to encourage them to start local trading activities 
by selling small amount of shares to the public. In December 1990, the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets started to operate (again in the case 
of Shanghai after a long period of interruption under Mao’s policies) with 
at the time only eight names listed representing a market capitalisation 
of USD 500 million. The situation has changed quite dramatically, as 
by the year 2017, more than 3,000 companies were listed with a market 
capitalisation of over RMB 50 trillion. A specific feature of the Chinese 
stock markets is the large representation of the most important Chinese 
companies that are state-owned, including large banks and oil companies 
that are controlled by the Central Government through the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the ruling State 
Council (SASAC), which appoints CEOs and makes decisions in terms of 
large investments (Andreosso-O’Callaghan & Gottwald, 2013; Firth, Gao, 
Shen, & Zhang, 2016; Gang & Hope, 2013). Through state ownership, 
the Chinese SOEs enjoy massive state support that insulates them from 
competition while facilitating the government growth policies. Shanghai 
has historically been home to China’s most prominent large capitalised 
companies. On the other hand, Shenzhen is host to smaller and mid- 
capitalised companies with a higher level of private ownership. Chinese 
SOEs still dominate the enterprises landscape, with SOEs representing 
around 70 per cent of the Chinese top-500 enterprises, 94 per cent of assets 
and 88 per cent of profits (OECD, 2017). They contribute to 93 per cent 
of the taxes generated, and they employ 89 per cent of the total workforce 
in the Chinese top-500 enterprises. A further breakdown of the outlined 
figures shows that in the manufacturing sector, SOEs account for about 
50 per cent of firms, contributing 61 per cent of the total profit. In the 
services sector, SOEs account for 61 per cent of the firms, with 93 per cent 
of assets and 92 per cent of profits among the top-500 enterprises (Gang, 
Yang, & Janus, 2009; OECD, 2017). At the global level and thanks to the 
Chinese Government ‘Go Global Strategy’, Chinese SOEs are becoming 
more and more significant, and they show high levels of concentration 
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in strategic sectors that help and serve specific government purposes. 
The significant presence of the Chinese government in these stock 
markets implies that price fluctuations in these stock exchanges are heavily 
dependent on the government moves and in particular on its short-term 
speculative strategies and as such, macroeconomic fundamentals do 
not appear to be impacting upon China’s major stock markets behav-
iour. Neither the Shanghai nor the Shenzhen stock exchange market is 
considered as being a ‘developed market’, and the two markets still 
need to engage in further modernisation processes that align them with 
international practices. Important areas of concern relate to the markets 
insufficient levels of transparency and lower financial reporting standards 
that pose serious limitations to the potential of developing analytical 
reports based on their companies’ financial results (Gang & Hope, 2013; 
OECD, 2017). Moreover, there is a serious disconnect between share 
valuations and financial results, a disconnect which is partly explained 
by the dominance of these SOEs in these stock exchanges, and therefore 
by the government’s political goals, often disregarding the interest of 
minority shareholders. Another aspect that needs to be considered is mar-
ket instability associated with the deterioration in the stock exchanges, a 
phenomenon exacerbated by corruption among stock market regulators; 
insider trading is common practice, and flows of personnel between the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the firms that 
trade in shares are unrestricted, leading to obvious conflicts of interest. 
To sum up, the characteristics, dynamics and stock holding patterns of the 
Chinese stock markets offer some interesting insights that help support the 
main empirical outcomes of this study indicating that the Chinese stock 
exchanges are relatively sheltered from EPU derived from Brexit and 
from the election of Donald Trump; Chinese stock markets behaviour is 
carefully designed and framed by the Chinese government.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In general, the research findings highlight the importance for world leading 
economies to maintain political stability, as their economic policies can 
generate significant levels of anxiety and uncertainty. There is no doubt 
that the GCR needs to monitor unfolding events in two of the world most 
developed economies, as China trade interests are quite linked to the 
USA and to the EU. However, in the context of the Greater China Region, 
the main research findings suggest that Brexit and the US election are 
not generating significant variations on market returns performance 
and the impact of EPU in the global context appears to be insignificant. 
Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 167
China’s stocks markets do not seem to be panicking and overreacting to 
recent major world events. These results seem to confirm China’s histori-
cal behaviour regarding international shocks in so far as the country has 
managed to remain unscathed, an outcome that can be explained by the 
tight control exercised by the government on its capital markets. Further 
research in the area should consider looking at causal effects running 
from international EPU; this would offer an in-depth understanding of 
the key political events that might have a greater impact on stock market 
performance in the Chinese context and of the trade channel and its spillo-
ver effects to the country’s main macroeconomic fundamentals and its 
capital markets.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Volatility Patterns on Studied Variables
(Appendix continued)
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Note
1. Macau is not included as part of this study because it does not have a stock 
market. However, companies can seek listing in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, as both regions financial regulatory authorities cooperate on issues 
of mutual concern.
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